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et al.: Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers and Parolees [State v. Ea

COMMENTS
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PROBATIONERS
AND PAROLEES
[State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980)].
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment provides that persons shall be free from unreasonable searches and that no search warrants shall issue except upon
probable cause.1 The United States Supreme Court has construed the
reasonableness and warrant requirements of the fourth amendment to be
1. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A provision in the Minnesota Constitution is in substance identical to the federal provision, but contains minor variations in punctuation and grammar.
See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Until recently, the scope of fourth amendment protection was determined on a caseby-case basis under the concept of "curtilage," which designated certain areas as "immunized by the Constitution from unreasonable search and seizure." Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139, 144 (1962); see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (Coast
Guard authorized to board and search vessels when probable cause of revenue law violation); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (open field is not area protected by
fourth amendment); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1964) (smokehouse within curtilage of residence); Polk v. United States, 291 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir.
1961) (common passageway in duplex not within curtilage), aj'dafterremand, 314 F.2d 837,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 844 (1963); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.) (cave on
farm not within curtilage), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956). See generaly Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396-401 (1974).
In the case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court rejected the concept of "constitutionally protected areas" as the only standard determining the scope of fourth amendment protection. The Katz Court, noting that the
"Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," held that individuals have an expectation of privacy in certain places, regardless of physical trespass, that falls within the ambit
of the fourth amendment. Id. at 351-52. The Katz Court stated: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. (citations omitted). In
State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 345 n.1, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 n.l (1975), the Minnesota
court noted that "Katz does not completely reject the concept of 'constitutionally protected areas,' and the concept still has vitality although it does not serve as a talismanic
solution to all Fourth Amendment questions." Thus, the Katz standard of expectation of
privacy has expanded the scope of fourth amendment protection.
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interdependent. 2 Thus, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable3 subject to such well defined exceptions as a limited search incident to a lawful arrest, the plain view doctrine, exigent circumstances, consent, and
the administrative search.4 In State v. Earnest, 5 the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted an additional exception, holding that the warrant clause
does not extend to searches of probationers conducted by their supervi6
sory officers.
2. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1972);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543
(1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
A 1950 Supreme Court decision generated concern that the reasonableness and warrant clauses would no longer be read interdependently. See United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969). See
generally Note, The Right ofthe People to Be Secure.- The Developing Role ofthe Search Warrant, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1119, 1119-20 (1967). In Rabinowitz, a search incident to an arrest was
upheld when officers had an opportunity to secure a warrant but failed to do so. The
Court stated "[tihe relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id. at 66; accord, State v. Houff, 309 Minn.
1, 5, 243 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1976) (Minnesota court upheld warrantless flashlight search
through car window on basis of Rabinowitz test); State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 346-47, 233
N.W.2d 736, 740 (1975) (Minnesota court upheld warrantless flashlight search through
basement window on basis of Rabinowitz test).
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Rabinowitz test in Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). In Chimel, the Court stated:
Rabinowitz and Ham's have been the subject of critical commentary for
many years, and have been relied upon less and less in our own decisions. It is
time, for the reasons we have stated, to hold that on their own facts, and insofar
as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with those that we have endorsed
today, they are no longer to be followed.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1972); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 55-59 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Note,
supra, at 1120.
3. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (nonforcible administrative search of firearms dealerships); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71
(1971) (seizure of evidence in plain view); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (nonforcible administrative search of retail liquor establishments);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (limited search incident to lawful arrest);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (search in "hot pursuit"); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948) (search in exigent circumstances, for example,
emergency, flight or escape, property in process of destruction); Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 591-94 (1946) (search with consent).
5. 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980).
6. See id. at 369. The Earnest court addressed the fourth amendment issue by assessing the overall reasonableness of the search rather than by determining whether it was
reasonable for the probation officer to secure a warrant. In this way, the court at least
impliedly relied upon the discredited authority of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 65-66 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). Rabinowitz focused judicial attention upon "whether the search was reasonable" rather than upon
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In Earnest, defendant was subject to a five-year probationary period
following his conviction for theft. 7 While on probation, defendant's probation officer received independent reports from reliable sources that defendant was using and selling drugs.8 The probation officer visited
defendant in his apartment to investigate these reports. When defendant
refused a request to search, the probation officer proceeded to search
without a warrant and without consent. The search produced a quantity
of amphetamines. Based on this evidence, defendant's probation was revoked by the trial court. 9
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a warrantless search of a probationer by a probation officer viowhether an officer could secure a warrant. 339 U.S. at 66; see note 2 supra. Other Minnesota decisions have upheld warrantless searches on the authority of RaMhowitz. See State v.
Houff, 309 Minn. 1, 5, 243 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1976); State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 346-47,
233 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1975). To the extent that Earnest, Houff, and Crea relied on Rabznowitz, their results are questionable under Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Rabinowitz. See note 2 supra.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in the past has addressed the question of the constitutional rights of parolees and probationers. See note 20 infra. Earnest, however, is the first
decision to delineate fourth amendment rights. In an earlier decision, State v. Colsch, 284
N.W.2d 839 (Minn. 1979), the court had an opportunity to confront this issue but declined to do so on the ground that, on the facts of that case, the issue did not present a
justiciable controversy. Faced with a constitutional challenge to a probation condition
that the defendant submit to warrantless searches, the Colsch court noted that no search
was made pursuant to that condition and held "defendant's claim is prematurely raised
and thus is not properly reviewable." Id. at 842. In Earnest, the defendant was in fact
subjected to a warrantless search by his probation officer. See notes 7-9 infa and accompanying text. His probation agreement, however, did not contain a condition that he must
submit to warrantless searches. See Appellant's Brief app. (probation agreement), State v.
Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980).
7. 293 N.W.2d at 367. Defendant was convicted of theft of a toolbox and was sentenced to five years imprisonment with execution stayed during that period contingent
upon supervised probation. As conditions of probation, the trial court required that defendant (1)violate no law or ordinance; (2) obey the rules and regulations of the commissioner of corrections; and (3) serve one year in a correctional facility. See 1d. The
probation conditions did not specify that Earnest be subject to warrantless searches by his
probation officer. See Appellant's Brief at 22 & app.
8. 293 N.W.2d at 367. In Earnest, the probation officer received information that
defendant was mistreating his parents and skipping work. The probation officer also received reports from another probationer and local law enforcement authorities that the
defendant was using and selling drugs. A notebook with a list of names and numbers was
found in defendant's vehicle that was searched in response to a complaint that it was
parked in a private driveway. One entry read "149 caps" and another "made $155." The
information contained in the notebook served as probable cause for the search of defendant's apartment. Id.
9. Id. at 368. The trial court found defendant had violated his conditions of probation in three respects: (1) by terminating employment without permission, (2) by assaulting his parents, and (3) by illegally possessing a controlled substance. The trial court held
the first two violations were insufficient grounds for revocation of probation, but the third
violation, "alone and in combination with the other two," was sufficient to justify revocation. Id.
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lated the fourth amendment.1o The Earnest court noted probation
searches are sui generis for fourth amendment purposes because of the
special considerations that underlie the relationship between a probation
officer and a probationer. II A probation officer is charged with the dual
responsibility of working to rehabilitate the offender and to protect the
public interest. To accomplish these goals outside the controlled environment of a correctional facility, the court asserted, a probation officer
must be afforded considerable latitude in collecting information on the
probationer's daily routines, relationships, and activities.12 The court
also noted the pervasive regulation of probationers and, correspondingly,
their lowered expectation of privacy, and the concern that imposition of
the warrant requirement to probation searches would deter courts from
ordering probation in marginal cases. 13 These special considerations militated against application of the traditional rule that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable.'4 The court concluded that the failure to secure
a warrant in these circumstances did not violate the Constitution.'5
In support of its assertion that "ordinary search and seizure law" did
not govern, the Earnest court noted four theories that serve as the basis
for affording special treatment to parolees and probationers: the grace,
contract-consent, constructive custody, and administrative search theories.' 6 This Comment will survey and analyze these four theories, with
particular emphasis on the administrative search theory and its application to the probation and parole systems. Second, the division of opinion
in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits on the scope of fourth amendment protection to be afforded probationers and parolees will be discussed. Third,
this Comment will examine the consequences of the Earnest decision and
suggest a resolution of certain issues under the administrative search theory. Finally, the exclusionary rule and its application to probation and
parole revocation proceedings will be discussed.
10. Id. at 368-69.
11. Id. at 368.
12. See id. at 368-69.
13. 293 N.W.2d at 369.
14. See id. Clearly, the search in Earnest would be found unconstitutional if traditional analysis were applied. It is axiomatic that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process. . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). In Earnest, the search of defendant's apartment was
conducted without a warrant and none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement were
present. 293 N.W.2d at 368; see note 4 supra.
15. See 293 N.W.2d at 369; notes 114-34 in7fta and accompanying text.
16. See 293 N.W.2d at 368-69 n.3. The court refused to rely exclusively on any one of
the four theories. Id.
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II.

RATIONALES FOR LIMITED FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
OF PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES

The Earnest decision was a case of first impression in Minnesota on the
fourth amendment rights of probationers and parolees. In a majority of
jurisdictions, probation and parole searches fall within the ambit of the
fourth amendment, but fewer protections are afforded probationers and
parolees than are provided to ordinary citizens.17 Four primary theories
supporting the majority view were cited by the Earnest court: grace, contract-consent, constructive custody, and administrative search.18 All but
the administrative search theory have been subjected to repeated and
persuasive criticism.19
17. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1976); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246,
248-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States ex rel. Santos v. New York
State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025
(1972); United States ex ret. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 12-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aft'd, 418 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); State v.
Jeffers, 116 Ariz. 192, 194-96, 568 P.2d 1090, 1092-94 (Ct. App. 1977); People v. Kasinger,
57 Cal. App. 3d 975, 978-79, 129 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484-85 (1976); People v. Anderson, 189
Colo. 34, 36-38, 536 P.2d 302, 304-05 (1975); Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577, 579-80 (Fla.
1976); State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 368-69 (Minn. 1980); People v. Huntley, 43
N.Y.2d 175, 179-82, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796-98, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33-35 (1977); State v.
Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 663, 665-66, 207 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 195-98, 361 A.2d 846, 848-50 (1976); State v. Tarrell, 74
Wis. 2d 647, 653-55, 247 N.W.2d 696, 700-01 (1976).
Under the minority view, to conduct a search against a parolee or probationer a
warrant is required although a reduced standard of probable cause may be employed. See,
e.g., United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1978) (warrant required
for full search of parolee's premises but reduced standard of probable cause employed);
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 788-90 (4th Cir. 1978) (warrant required for full
search of parolee's residence but reduced standard of probable cause employed); State v.
Ganz, 297 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (probationer entitled to constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures, however, status as probationer may
be considered in determining reasonableness or probable cause); People v. Eastin, 8 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 519-22, 289 N.E.2d 673, 677-79 (1972) (state failed to demonstrate exception
to fourth amendment protections); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537-40 (Iowa)
(when search relates to new and independent criminal charge, parolee is entitled to full
fourth amendment protection), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); cf. United States v. Lewis,
274 F. Supp. 184, 186-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (parolee's acquiescence to warrantless search by
FBI agents insufficient to establish consent exception to full fourth amendment
protections).
18. See notes 20-64 infra and accompanying text. See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 10.10, at 421-35 (1978 & Supp. 1981); White, The Fourth Amendment Rights
of Parolees and Ptobationers, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 167 (1969).
19. See, e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 248-50 (9th Cir.) (court rejects constructive custody theory and employs administrative search theory), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897
(1975); United States ex ret. Randazzo v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1969)
(court employs administrative search theory), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); People v.
Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-51, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101-04 (1964) (court criticizes grace and contract theories and employs constructive custody theory), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 953 (1965); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 421-35; White, supra note 18, at
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The Grace, Contract-Consent,and Constructive Custody Theories

Under the grace theory, a probationer or parolee has no legally protected right to the liberty conferred by that status. 2 0 Probation or parole

is granted by the state as a matter of grace. As noted by one commentator, this view rests on two considerations:
First, that the parolee has been convicted and sentenced for crime and
thus has been deprived of his liberty in accordance with due process of
law. Second, that the state has the uncontrolled option to require those
convicted of crime to remain imprisoned for the full length of their
2
sentences. 1
Under the grace theory, a probationer or parolee is deemed to have impliedly waived his fourth amendment rights. The sacrifice of constitutional guarantees is seen as the quid pro quo for the gratuitous conferral
of liberty.2 2 A probationer or parolee enjoys only those limited constitutional rights that are afforded incarcerated offenders. 2 3 Thus, if the releasing authority revokes probation or parole even for entirely arbitrary
reasons or based on what would ordinarily be illegally seized evidence,
177-81; Note, Parole. A Critique ofIts LegalFoundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 702,
704-20 (1963); Note, Extendinvg Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in Caifornzia, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 129, 133 (1969); Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Warrantless Parole O~fer
Searches-A New Rationale, 60 MINN. L. REv. 805, 807-08 & n.12 (1976).
20. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 426-27. In Earnest, the grace theory
was not expressly relied on, however, the court stated it was one of four theories on which
the decision could be based. See 292 N.W.2d at 368-69 n.3; text accompanying note 117
infra.
Several Minnesota decisions have relied expressly on the grace theory, although not
for fourth amendment purposes. See State ex rel. Ahern v. Young, 273 Minn. 240, 247, 141
N.W.2d 15, 19 (1966) (court denies good time credit for time served on probation, stating
true nature of probation is act of grace unrelated to merit or worthiness of wrongdoer);
State ex rel. Koalska v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 46, 52, 66 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1954) (revised
parole rules are not ex post facto laws; "parole is an act of grace and can be withheld or
revoked, if granted, without depriving a prisoner of any legal rights"), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
908 (1955), modified on other grounds, State ex rel. Cole v. Tahash, 269 Minn. 1, 9, 129
N.W.2d 903, 908 (1964); State ex rel. Bush v. Whittier, 226 Minn. 356, 362, 32 N.W.2d
856, 859 (1948) (parole agreement can be revoked by board and relator returned to custody without hearing or cause); Guy v. Utecht, 216 Minn. 255, 265, 12 N.W.2d 753, 758
(1943) (pardon is act of grace; revocation is not deprivation of legal right); State ex rel.
Jaffa v. Crepeau, 150 Minn. 80, 83, 184 N.W. 567, 568 (1921) (parole is act of grace
binding parolee to conditions imposed by statute). To the extent the preceding decisions
held that a parolee or probationer has no due process rights in revocation proceedings,
they are overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probationer has due process right to preliminary and final revocation hearings under conditions specified in MorrnseY); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

480-90 (1972) (parolee has due process right to preliminary and final revocation hearings);
accord, State ex rel. Djonne v. Schoen, 299 Minn. 131, 133-34, 217 N.W.2d 508, 510 (1974)
(Minnesota court applied Morrsse doctrine to revocation of work release and parole).
21. Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.
702, 704 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
22. See id. at 704.
23. Similar to the constructive custody theory, see notes 29-30 in/ia and accompany-
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the probationer or parolee is without right to challenge the revocation,
subject to recent Supreme Court decisions requiring minimum due
24
process.
Both the grace theory and the contract-consent theory are based on
waivers of fourth amendment rights. Under the contract-consent theory,
however, fourth amendment rights are deemed to have been expressly
rather than impliedly waived by consent to the terms of the probation or
parole agreement. 25 If the agreement specifies that an individual is subject to periodic, unannounced searches, the probationer or parolee is considered to have expressly waived any objection on fourth amendment
grounds. 26 Accordingly, if the probation or parole agreement failed to
ing text, probationers and parolees are at least impliedly analogized to prisoners and are
subject to searches to the same extent as incarcerated offenders.
Until recently, the scope and intrusiveness of prison searches were almost without
limit, and such searches were considered to be per se reasonable. See Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.9, at 396-421; Giannelli &
Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures. "Locking" the Fourth Amendment Out of CorrectionalFacilities, 62 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1046-47 (1976). Several recent decisions suggest that at least a
modicum of protection should be afforded prisoners. See, e.g., United States v. Stumes,
549 F.2d 831, 832 (8th Cir. 1977) (prisoners do not forfeit all fourth amendment rights but
do not enjoy same measure of protection as nonincarcerated individuals); United States v.
Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975).
24. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (minimum due process required
in probation revocation proceedings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-90 (1972)
(minimum due process required in parole revocation proceedings). For a discussion of the
constitutional deficiencies that are inherent in the grace theory, see notes 31-49 in/a and
accompanying text.
25. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 427-3 1. See generally Note, supra note
21. Pursuant to the contract-consent theory, fourth amendment protection is contingent
upon the terms of the contract between the state and the probationer or parolee. If periodic unannounced searches by the supervisory officer are a condition of the parole or
probation agreement, the parolee or probationer is deemed to have "bargained away" his
fourth amendment protection as the quid pro quo for his release. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 115 Ariz. 583, 584, 566 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1977); People v. Mason, 4 Cal. 3d 759,
763-66, 488 P.2d 630, 632, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972);
Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 299, 496 P.2d 763, 765 (1972); State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C.
App. 663, 665, 207 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 (1974).
While most courts have enforced such waiver provisions without reference to their
breadth, some courts have examined these provisions to determine if they are overly
broad. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1976) (condition
permitting search by "any law enforcement officer" is valid when "narrowly and properly
exercised"); People v. Freund, 48 Cal. App. 3d 49, 56-58, 119 Cal. Rptr. 762, 767-68 (1975)
(general search condition upheld but provision requiring waiver of police "knocking" procedure struck down); State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 63, 665-66, 207 S.E.2d 263, 265
(1974) (condition allowing warrantless search did not waive right to insist search be conducted in lawful manner; evidence obtained by unannounced break-in through locked
door excluded).
26. See note 25 supra. A typical waiver provision is found in State v. Colsch, 284
N.W.2d 839 (Minn. 1979). In Colsch, defendant challenged a condition of his probation
agreement that provided, "you shall submit your person, place of residence and vehicle to
search and seizure at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant by
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provide search conditions, the individual would enjoy the full panoply of
fourth amendment rights afforded ordinary citizens.27 In this limited respect, the rights provided to probationers and parolees may be greater
under the contract-consent theory than under the grace theory because
under the grace theory a waiver of fourth amendment rights is always
implied from the act of accepting liberty prior to the expiration of the
28
sentence.
The third traditional rationale is the constructive custody theory.
Under this theory, probationers or parolees are analogized to prisoners.
Although not in actual custody, probationers and parolees are deemed to
be in the "constructive custody" of the state. As a result, they enjoy only
those fourth amendment protections afforded to inmates:29 "Prison authorities may subject inmates to intense surveillance and search unimpeded by Fourth Amendment barriers. .

.

. Although a parolee is not a

prison inmate in the physical sense, he is constructively a prisoner under
legal custody of the State Department of Corrections . ... "30
B.

Criticism of the Traditional Theories

The traditional theories of grace, contract-consent, and constructive
custody recently have been subjected to repeated and insightful chalyour agent from the Department of Corrections or by any police officer or sheriff when
requested to do so." Id. at 841. The Co/sch court held that the issue did not present a
justiciable controversy because no search had been conducted pursuant to the condition.
Set id. at 841-42. For a discussion of the constitutional infirmities of the contract-consent
theory, see notes 31-49 in.ta and accompanying text.
27. The search conditions contained in probation agreements, however, are often expressed in very broad terms. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 115 Ariz. 583, 583, 566 P.2d
1329, 1329 (1977); People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 763, 488 P.2d 630, 634, 97 Cal. Rptr.
302, 306 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); State v. Colsch, 284 N.W.2d 839, 841
(Minn. 1979); Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 298, 496 P.2d 763, 764-65 (1972).
28. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 54 Cal. App. 3d 149, 153, 126 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (1975);
Echols v. State, 201 So. 2d 89, 93-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); State v. Williams, 486
S.W.2d 468, 472-73 (Mo. 1972); People v. Santos, 31 A.D.2d 508, 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526,
528, afd, 25 N.Y.2d 976, 252 N.E.2d 861, 305 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
969 (1970). Seegenerally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 423-26; White, supra note
18, at 177-81; Note, supra note 21, at 711-20; Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to
Parolees in Caifornna, 22 STAN. L. REv. 129, 132-34 (1969).
One Minnesota decision has at least impliedly relied in part upon the custody theory
although not for fourth amendment purposes. See State ex rel. Stephenson v. Ryan, 235
Minn. 161, 50 N.W.2d 259 (1951). In Stephenson the court held that an Indiana parolee
who had moved to Minnesota in violation of parole conditions was a "fugitive from justice" for purposes of an extradition warrant issued by the governor of Minnesota on the
request of the governor of Indiana. Id. at 170, 50 N.W.2d at 264. By analogizing a breach
of the parole agreement with flight from the law, the court relied at least in part on the
constructive custody theory.
30. People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (1964)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). For a discussion of the constitutional
arguments undermining the custody theory, see notes 50-53 infba and accompanying text.
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lenge. 3 1 Each of these theories apparently is premised on the idea that
constitutional rights turn on whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a privilege or right. This approach, however, has been rejected
by the United States Supreme Court, although not in the context of
search and seizure law.32 In Morrssey v. Brewer,33 the Court stated: "It is
hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of
whether the parolee's liberty is a 'right' or a 'privilege.' By whatever
name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 34 The approach advocated by the Morrissey Court is supported by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Under this doctrine the government has no duty to grant certain benefits
or privileges, but once these benefits or privileges are conferred, constitutional protections attach.35 In the context of probation or parole, liberty
31. See note 19 supra.
32. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
33. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrssey, the petitioners challenged the procedure permitting revocation of their parole without notice or hearing. The Court began with an
examination of the interests involved in parole revocations. See id. at 477-80. Rejecting
the "right-privilege distinction," the Court held a parolee's interest in revocation was
within the "liberty or property" language of the fourteenth amendment to which due
process attached. See id. at 481-82. The Court further held, however, that the "revocation
of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations." Id. at 480. Applying a flexible standard of due process, the Court found that a parolee must be afforded
(1) a reasonably prompt informal hearing; (2) written notice of the alleged violations of
parole and the date and time of the hearing; (3) disclosure of the evidence against him;
(4) an opportunity to appear in person at the hearing and present witnesses and evidence;
(5) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (6) a "neutral and detached" hearing body; and (7) a written statement of the reasons for the revocation. Id. at 489. See
Stateexrel. Djonne v. Schoen, 299 Minn. 131, 133-34, 217 N.W.2d 508, 510 (1974) (Morssey doctrine applied to work release and parole revocations). But cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) (entitlement to
due process in parole denial as opposed to parole revocation limited to opportunity to be
heard and notice of reasons for denial). The Morrissey and Greenholtz decisions are compared profitably for the proposition that parolees and probationers are not analogous to
prisoners for purposes of constitutional rights. Particularly illustrative is the Court's comment in Morntsey that "[although the parolee is often formally described as being 'in
custody,' the argument cannot even be made here that summary treatment is necessary as
it may be with respect to controlling a larger group of potentially disruptive prisoners in
actual custody." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
34. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 178, 285-88 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90
(1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). Seegeneral Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Prfivilege Distinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439, 1445-51
(1968); Note, Unconstitutional Condithns, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
One commentator has drawn a persuasive analogy between parolees and aliens to
support the proposition that parolees should be afforded greater constitutional protection
than prisoners. See Note, supra note 21, at 710-11. Relying upon the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, this commentator notes:
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has been conferred with an attendant expectation of privacy from governmental intrusion.36 It is not sufficient merely to conclude that a probationer or parolee has either impliedly under the grace theory or
expressly under the contract-consent theory waived his fourth amendment protections. 37 Nor is it sufficient to state under the constructive
custody theory that as a "constructive prisoner" he only enjoys the rights
of an incarcerated offender. 38 The proper focus of inquiry with respect
to the grace and contract-consent theories is whether such protections
have been waived in accordance with the Constitution.39 Accordingly,
with respect to the custody theory, the proper focus of inquiry is whether
governmental and individual interests differ in relation to prisoners on
the one hand and probationers and parolees on the other.40
Two rationales have been employed to uphold the constitutionality of
fourth amendment waivers under the contract-consent and grace theories.41 First, an offender is considered to have consented voluntarily prior
to the search. 42 Second, the terms of the probation or parole agreement
are said to have diminished an offender's legitimate expectation of privacy, thereby circumscribing the scope of fourth amendment protection
43
to which he is entitled.
The rationale of "voluntary consent" to warrantless searches as a precondition to the grant of probation or parole is inherently suspect. A
convicted offender before a court or board faces almost certain denial of
The positions of the alien and the parolee are not dissimilar. Neither has a right
to join the society of free men; only by the permission of the sovereign is either
permitted to enter that society.
The Supreme Court has at least recognized that the Constitution applies to
aliens. . . . With respect to parolees, however, the Court has held the Constitution to be inapplicable. If aliens are afforded due process of law, it is difficult to
see why parolees should not receive like protection. To answer that the parolee
has already been convicted . . . begs the question, for that fact goes only to the
question of whether the parolee shall initially be given his freedom. Once liberty
is restored . . . the past should not control the rights of the parolee any more
than it controls the rights of the alien.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); State ex rel. Djonne v.
Schoen, 299 Minn. 131, 133-34, 217 N.W.2d 508, 510 (1974).
37. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
38. See White, supra note 18, at 178-81; notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
39. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 426-31; notes 41-47 infra and accompanying text.
40. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 425-31; White, supra note 18, at 17881; Note, Extending Search-and-SeieureProtectionto Paroleesin Calornia,22 STAN. L. REV. 129,
132-34 (1969).
41. For an extensive discussion of the validity of waiver provisions, see Note, Striking
the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision." The Fourth Amendment and Parole and Probation Offreer Searches of Paroleesand Probationers, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 800, 803-13 (1976).
42. See note 25 supra.
43. See, e.g., People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 764-65, 488 P.2d 630, 633, 97 Cal. Rptr.
302, 305 (197 1), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); Russi v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d
160, 166, 108 Cal. Rptr. 716, 718-19 (1973).
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probation or parole if he withholds consent to a search condition in the
probation or parole agreement. As noted by the United States Supreme
Court:
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not
be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert
force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting "consent" would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified po44
lice intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.
The custodial status of an allegedly consenting individual is an important factor to be considered in determining coercive circumstances.45
The advance waiver of fourth amendment protections in return for the
grant of liberty scarcely can be considered an exercise of free will.46 As

noted by one commentator, "to speak of consent in this context is to
resort to a 'manifest fiction.' "47
Similarly, the "diminished expectation of privacy" rationale suffers
serious flaws. This rationale fails to address what fourth amendment
protections exist in relation to probationers and parolees, providing no
limits on the extent to which the government may intrude on an individual's privacy. 48 In essence, the diminished expectation of privacy rationale supports any governmental intrusion on the basis that the probability
of intrusion itself lowers the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy, thereby limiting the scope of fourth amendment protection. To
accept this analysis "is to allow the diminution of constitutional rights to
serve as its own justification."49 Thus, the rationale provides no objective measure against which governmental intrusions may be constitutionally assessed and limited.
The constructive custody theory equally is subject to persuasive criticism. By analogizing probationers and parolees to prisoners for fourth
amendment purposes, the theory fails to reflect substantial differences
between the incarcerated offender and probationers and parolees.50 In
the prison setting, periodic or unannounced searches are necessary to pre44. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
Voluntariness is a factual question to be considered in light of all the circumstances.
Id. at 248-49; United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973); United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
46. See People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1063, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800
(1973), overruledon other grounds , People v. McGaughran, 585 P.2d 206, 214 & n.19, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 592 & n.19 (1978); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 692 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976).
47. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 429 (quoting People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d
759, 770, 488 P.2d 630, 636, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 308 (1971) (Peters, J., dissenting), cert.
denzed, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972)).
48. See Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384
(1974); Note, supra note 41, at 806.
49. Note, supra note 41, at 806.
50. See Note, supra note 40, at 133.
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vent riot and individual violence.51 These compelling governmental interests are absent in the probation or parole setting. Furthermore, the
regimented nature of the guardhouse coupled with the absence of personal property renders prison searches less personal and less intrusive.52
The same cannot be said of probation or parole searches. A probationer's or parolee's environment fosters an expectation of privacy regarding home and belongings. Probation and parole searches are far
more intrusive when conducted in an apartment or home and directed
against personal property. This is particularly true when such searches
may intrude upon the privacy of other individuals living with the probationer or parolee, who bear no connection with the purposes of the
search. The scope of fourth amendment protection afforded to probationers or parolees in contrast to incarcerated offenders should reflect
these substantial differences. 53 Application of the constructive custody
theory, however, fails in this task.
All three traditional theories support limited fourth amendment protection for probationers and parolees. By nature, however, each theory
exists as a conclusion rather than as a method of analysis. The focus of
constitutional inquiry under each theory is fixed on the status of the probationer or parolee as an inmate at sufferance. The pivotal issue of
fourth amendment protection is ultimately determined by reference to a
prior criminal adjudication in which liberty was deprived. What is lacking in the traditional theories is a conceptual framework within which
society's interests in supervision and rehabilitation may be weighed
against the individual probationer's or parolee's interest in privacy.54 A
balancing approach affords the means by which the fourth amendment
rights of probationers and parolees may be safeguarded while still serving
the important societal interests underlying probation and parole
searches. Only in this way may probation and parole searches present no
51. Seegeneraly 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.09, at 396-421.
52. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962).
53. Several decisions have questioned the validity of the constructive custody theory.
See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978) ("We are not persuaded to adopt . . . [the constructive custody theory]."); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d
246, 248 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975) ("[Tlhe notion that the status of parolees is legally comparable to that of prisoners in actual custody ... [is] logically inconsistent and ignor[es] reality."); In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 646, 463 P.2d 734, 737, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 385 (1970) ("[F]ictions of 'custody' and the like ... cannot change the reality
of a parolee's conditional freedom and cannot affect the constitutional protections surrounding his interest in that conditional freedom."), cert. dented, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 37, 536 P.2d 302, 304-05 (1975) ("[Plarole conditions are
quite different from confinement in a prison and entitle the parolee to some constitutional
protection commensurate with the degree of liberty afforded by parole."); State v. Simms,
10 Wash. App. 75, 84, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1973) ("Considering the interest of the parolee
in his liberty and privacy, it would seem to be beyond question that to subject the parolee
to arbitrary and capricious searches ... would be constitutionally impermissible.').
54. Ste notes 55-84 infra and accompanying text.
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greater intrusion than is necessary to serve the paramount goals of the
probation and parole systems.
C

The Administrative Search Theory

As noted by some courts and commentators, probation and parole
searches conducted by supervisory officers are similar to administrative
searches and inspections. 5 5 In Camara v. Municzpal Court,56 the United
States Supreme Court established the general rule governing administrative searches. In Camara, a health inspector entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible housing standard
violations. The inspector was refused admittance at one residence because he lacked a search warrant. The resident was prosecuted for refusing to permit a lawful inspection.57 On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that when consent to a search is withheld in a nonemergency situation, a
warrant to inspect the premises must be obtained. 58 In support of this
conclusion, the Court stated:
[T]he question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of
search in question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search. 59
Applying this standard, the Camara Court found that the procurement
of a warrant would not impair the primary governmental interest in prevention of conditions hazardous to public health and safety. 60 Thus, administrative inspectors must obtain a warrant after entry is refused to the
premises sought to be searched. 6 1 The Camara Court, however, refused to
impose a traditional showing of probable cause to support the issuance of
55. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975);
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); In re
Martinez, I Cal. 3d 641, 647 n.6, 463 P.2d 734, 738 n.6, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386 n.6, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 196-98, 361
A.2d 846, 849-50 (1976); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 84, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094
(1973); cf. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1978) (court analogized probation searches to administrative searches but imposed warrant requirement);
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978) (court analogized parole
searches to administrative searches but found warrant requirement applicable); State v.
Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 368-69 n.3 (Minn. 1980) (court cited balancing theory of administrative search cases as one possible basis for decision, holding warrant requirement
did not apply to probation searches). See generaly 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at
431-35; White, supra note 18, at 182-83; Note, supra note 40, at 137-40; Comment, Parolees
Extended Significani fotectionfrom WarrantlessSearches of Residences by Parole Ofjiers, 30 S.C.L.
REv. 813, 819-21 (1979).
56. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
57. Id. at 526-27.
58. Id. at 540.
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id. at 534.
61. Id. at 539-40.
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a warrant. 62 Instead, the Court adopted a "variable cause" standard,
balancing the need to search against the invasion the search entails.63
Coupled with the warrant requirement, the adoption of the variable
cause standard ensures that administrative searches are only as intrusive
as necessary to serve the important governmental interests that give rise
to the search. 64
Application of the administrative search "balancing" theory to probation and parole searches is appropriate for several reasons. First, the theory focuses on the respective interests of the individual and the
government and on the type of official action involved. 65 Under the
traditional rationales, all probationers and parolees are treated identically. A probationer or parolee categorically is considered to have either
waived fourth amendment protection or to have been deprived of that
protection upon conviction. This determination is made without refer62. See id. at 534-539. The Court found that the test of probable cause is conditioned
by the need and nature of the search being contemplated. In this regard, the Court stated:
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search
be obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to
search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply
this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen.
Id. at 534-35.
63. See id. at 536-37 ("Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.").
In response to criticism that such a standard would produce "synthetic search warrants," the Court stated:
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is
still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. . . . Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause
requirement in this area.
Id. at 539. But see Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 252 (9th Cir.) (plurality stated in
regard to parole search "[w]e have no desire to reduce the warrant to a paper tiger."), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
64. See notes 114-51 infra and accompanying text.
65. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978). After applying the balancing theory and concluding that the warrant requirement was applicable to
probation searches, the Worban court stated:
The restriction on a probation officer's authority to search does not preclude
warrantless visits to the probationer's home or place of employment. Inherent in
the probation officer's duty to "use all suitable methods.., to aid probationers
and to bring about improvements in their conduct and condition" is authority to
visit the probationer. A visit, however, is not a search.
Id. (footnote ommitted). See Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1976); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 197-98, 361 A.2d 846, 849-50 (1976). But see
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971) (AFDC caseworker visits to beneficiaries are
not searches triggering fourth amendment protection, and even so, are reasonable). See
generalY 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 10.10, at 433-43; White, supra note 18, at 183-97.
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ence to the intrusiveness of the official action, the effect it would have on
rehabilitation, or the specific governmental interests underlying a particular search.66 The traditional theories fail to recognize the government
does not have the same interest in every search and an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy is not the same in every case. 6 7 The administrative search theory inherently involves such analysis.
Second, the balancing theory incorporates a more realistic view of the
causal relationship between official action and the rehabilitation of probationers or parolees.68 The theory is designed to ensure an offender's
privacy is invaded only when and to the extent necessary to protect the
public interest and to effect a proper rehabilitation. In this way, the rehabilitative goal of the probation and parole systems is advanced by
avoiding indiscriminate or "harassment" searches and by cultivating
trust between the supervising officer and probationer or parolee.69 Unlike the traditional rationales, the balancing theory specifically focuses on
the rehabilitative goal and the effect that a search may have upon that
goal.
Third, the balancing theory requires the scope of probation or parole
supervision be determined not only by the supervising officer, but by the
releasing authority-either a parole board or sentencing judge-as well
as a neutral, detached magistrate issuing a warrant:
[T]he parole board's judgment as to the necessity of a particular form
of surveillance should be given great weight. The question of what
forms of surveillance are necessary to effect a proper rehabilitation is
presumably within the special expertise of the parole board. Furthermore, since the board generally has wide discretion to decide when a
prisoner will be released on parole, rules forbidding certain types of
surveillance might affect a particular parolee's chances of being released because the parole board might reason that this prisoner could
be safely paroled only if surveillance of a certain type was freely allowed. These considerations must lead to judicial circumspection in
passing on a parole board's assessment of the necessity of particular
types of surveillance.
On the other hand, courts must not abdicate their responsibility for
subjecting the parole boards to some judicial control. After giving due
weight to the parole board's determination that a particular supervisory technique is essential to an effective parole program, courts should
balance the societal gains to be achieved by the supervision against the
parolee's resulting loss of privacy.70
The requirement of carefully tailoring forms of surveillance to a par66. See notes 31-53 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 41-54 supra and accompanying text.
68. See White, supra note 18, at 186-97. See generally Note, supra note 40, at 134-40.
69. See State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 370, 372 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J.,

concurring specially); notes 129-34 infra and accompanying text.
70. White, supra note 18, at 184 (footnotes omitted).
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ticular offender upon release admirably serves the rehabilitative goal of
the parole and probation systems. It not only solicits the expertise of the
parole board but also places the offender on notice of the permissible
scope of governmental intrusion for supervisory purposes. This approach
is consonant with the suggestion that administrative regulations be
promulgated with standards to govern when searches of probationers
and parolees are appropriate.71 There are four primary advantages to
administrative rulemaking in this context. First, rulemaking provides a
pervasive safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. 72 Second, rulemaking would not have the problems of lack of clarity and intelligibility found in the fourth amendment. 73 Third, it would reduce the
great variation in parole and probation practices. Fourth, expertise from
all spheres of the criminal justice system could be drawn upon to promulgate the regulations. 74 Finally, and most importantly, rulemaking would
allow courts to regulate fourth amendment questions arising from police
activities that do not lend themselves to traditional regulation by warrant or probable cause requirements.75
The determination of the parole board on the form and extent of supervision and the exercise of discretion by the supervisory officer should
71. See Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 416-17. See also Hudson, Galaway, Henschel,
Lindgren & Penton, Diversion Programmingin CriminalJustice: The Case of Minesota, 39 FED.
PROBATION 11 (1975).

72. Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 418.
73. Id. at 418-19.
74. Id. at 419-22.
75. Id. at 422.
Professor Davis also discusses the extent to which police decisionmaking and, by analogy, probation or parole decisionmaking are relatively untouched by legal process:
Police-made law is often both unauthorized and unjust, but whatever the
theoretical law, the practicalities usually are that police-made law is unreviewable.
Lawyers who follow the work of the federal courts know that they spend an
enormous portion of their time--often as much as one-third of their time-in
applying the exclusionary rule in order to control police behavior. One may
easily get the impression from reading Supreme Court opinions that the police
are quite fully checked by federal courts. But that is not the fact. The exclusionar
rule reaches only two or three percent ofpolice activities. The police spend less than five
percent of their time obtaining evidence, and much of the evidence they collect is
for purposes other than presentation in a proceeding. Judicial control through
the exclusionary rule fails to reach ninety-seven or ninety-eight percent of what
police do.
K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 265 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis in original). Professor Davis, quoting from an ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
contends that police rulemaking is a necessity:
Police discretion can best be structured and controlled through the process of
administrative rule-making by police agencies. Police administrators should,
therefore, give the highest priority to the formulation of administrative rules governing the exercise of discretion, particularly in the areas of selective enforcement, investigative techniques, and enforcement methods.
Id. at 274.
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not be immune from judicial scrutiny. 76 The scope and timing of judicial review, however, should be governed by the character of the supervision contemplated. Less intrusive supervision such as an unscheduled
daytime home visit, a frisk for weapons, or an examination of an offender's arm for narcotic injections should be exempt from the traditional procedure of securing a warrant prior to the intrusion.77 In
addition, a less stringent standard than probable cause should be required for this type of supervision. Other more intrusive supervisory
techniques such as an unscheduled nighttime home visit, a full body
search, or a search of an offender's premises should be subject to the war78
rant procedure and should be based upon probable cause.
Under the administrative search theory, two distinctive issues are present: whether a warrant must be procured prior to the search and what
quantum of evidence is necessary to undertake the search. Generally,
administrative searches must be evidenced by a warrant except when it
can be demonstrated that the burden of obtaining a warrant will frustrate the purpose of the search. 79 Because unscheduled nighttime home
visits, full body searches, and searches of an offender's premises are not
often needed for effective probation and parole supervision, a demonstration that the warrant requirement would frustrate the purpose of the
search could not be made. Supervisory officers ordinarily have ample
opportunity to secure a warrant prior to undertaking any official action
of this type. Thus, the authority to pursue the most intrusive supervision
should be evidenced by a warrant. The warrant requirement is not nec76. See White, supra note 18, at 183-84.
77. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978) (visits to probationer's home or place of employment are not subject to warrant requirement); Croteau
v. State, 334 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1976) (probation officer may visit probationer's home to
"observe life style"); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 197-98, 361 A.2d
846, 849-50 (1976) (parole officer not required to obtain warrant "when performing his
normal duties" of supervising parolee). See generally White, supra note 18, at 186-93.
78. See notes 122-34, 142-51 infra and accompanying text. See generally White, spra
note 18, at 193-97.
These types of supervisory techniques should be treated differently because they involve far greater invasions of the offender's privacy. Unscheduled nighttime visits, for
example, are "more likely to inspire terror and disturb the tranquillity of the home than
similar invasions made during the day." Id. at 188; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) ("The
warrant shall be served in daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision
in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other
than daytime."). Similarly, a home search or full body search is far more offensive than a
frisk or an examination of an offender's arm. When significant invasions of an individual's
privacy are contemplated, a greater burden should be imposed on the government to justify the invasion. Although the aforementioned types of supervision by no means exhaust
those to which a probationer or parolee might be subject, they do serve as a point of
reference to guide a case-by-case determination of when the warrant procedure and probable cause standard should be required.
79. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967); note 59 supra and
accompanying text.
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essary, however, for less intrusive supervision such as an unscheduled
daytime home visit, a frisk for weapons, or an examination of an offender's arm. With respect to this type of supervision, the imposition of
the warrant requirement may well frustrate the purpose behind the supervision. Prior to every home visit, frisk, or examination, a supervisory
officer would likely need a warrant because the special character of the
probation or parole relationship would give rise to a presumption that
consent was coerced. 80 Thus, the burden of the warrant requirement in
this context is far greater than that existing in ordinary administrative
inspections in which consent is presumed voluntary. 8'
In determining what quantum of evidence is necessary to conduct a
search, the administrative search theory incorporates a "variable cause"
standard, which is established by balancing the need to search against
the invasion that the search entails.82 With the less intrusive methods of
supervision, the invasion of an offender's privacy is relatively minimal
because the intrusion is comparatively inoffensive and limited in scope
and because the supervisory officer is known to the offender. In the category of more intrusive supervision, however, the invasion of privacy is of
the most intrusive nature. The governmental interests underlying each
category also differ. An unscheduled daytime home visit, a frisk for
weapons, or an examination of an offender's arm are more clearly
designed to effect the rehabilitation of an offender.8 3 An unscheduled
80. See White, supra note 18, at 189. Professor White notes that a probationer or
parolee is dependent "upon the good will of his supervising officer." Id. In these circumstances, he argues that any consent must be presumed involuntary. See id.; cf. Montana v.
Tomich, 332 F.2d 987, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1964) (parolee's consent to search of car trunk by
arresting officer held invalid without reference to presumption of involuntary consent).
81. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) ("most citizens allow
inspections of their property without a warrant"). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note
18, § 10.10, at 437; White, supra note 18, at 188-90.
82. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967) ("no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion the search entails"); notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 68-69 supra. In the dissenting opinion in Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d
246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975), Judge Hufstedler noted that "[t]he warrant
requirement does not deprive the parole officer of any legitimate tool that he needs to
practice his craft. He needs no warrant to visit his charge's home. . . . In short, . . . the
parole officer, unlike a policeman, can gain warrantless entry for visiting purposes." Id. at
258 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
Of course, a frisk for weapons does not ordinarily have as its focus the rehabilitation
of the released offender. Rather, the purpose of a frisk is to ensure the safety of the parole
or probation officer. Frisks, however, are limited in scope, although certainly within the
sphere of fourth amendment protection. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (frisk
permissible when reasonably prudent person in circumstances would believe that his
safety or that of others was threatened). Professor White advocates a system under which
the parole board-or in the case of probation, the sentencing judge-be permitted to authorize "personal examination" warrants that allow a frisk for weapons or an inspection
for narcotic injections during a specified period. See White, supra note 18, at 192-93. Professor White concludes:
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nighttime home visit, a full body search, or a search of an offender's
premises, however, is most likely conducted to gather evidence for the
purposes of either revocation or a subsequent prosecution. Thus, the potential for abuse to harass an offender or to use the probation or parole
relationship as a subterfuge for criminal prosecution is far greater with
regard to the category of more intrusive supervision.84 On balance, then,
probable cause should be required when intrusive supervision is contemplated. A less stringent standard of justification, however, should be required for a daytime visit, a frisk, or an examination. With respect to
these supervisory forms, the protection afforded an offender by a more
rigorous standard would be minimal because of the inoffensive character
of the invasion and the low potential for abuse.
III.

A

COMPARISON OF THE DECISIONS OF THE FOURTH
AND NINTH CIRCUITS

The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on a probationer's or
parolee's fourth amendment rights. Lower federal courts have dealt with
the question, however, and a division of opinion has arisen that is typified by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.85
The Ninth Circuit has cited both the contract-consent and administraThrough this type of warrant procedure, the practice of making personal
inspections could be more nearly limited to those cases in which inspections are
in fact necessary to an effective parole program. Further, the parolee would be
afforded the protection of having the determination of whether he should be
subjected to personal inspections within the ultimate discretion of the courts
rather than his parole officer.
Id. at 193. See generally Note, supra note 40, at 134-36.
84. Some courts have assessed the reasonableness of probation and parole searches,
and hence their legality by examining the underlying purpose of the search. If the supervisory officer was merely a "stalking horse" or agent of the police, then a warrantless
search was found to violate the fourth amendment. See United States v. Hallman, 365
F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10,
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afdon other grounds, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
984 (1971); People v. Way, 65 Misc. 2d 865, 870-73, 319 N.Y.S.2d 16, 23-24 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 197-98, 361 A.2d 846, 850 (1976); cf. United
States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975) (court would permit participation by police but would not condone use of probation searches as "subterfuge for
criminal investigations"); State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 369 n.6 (Minn. 1980) (for
search initiated and executed by police but accompanied by probation officer, best course
of action is to obtain warrant whenever possible). Most courts, however, have refused to
invalidate probation or parole searches when police have participated. See, e.g., United
States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1976); People v. Byrd, 38 Cal. App. 3d
941, 950, 113 Cal. Rptr. 777, 783-84 (1974); People v. Gilkey, 6 Cal. App. 3d 183, 188, 85
Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
85. Compare United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) and
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975) with United
States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d
787 (4th Cir. 1978).
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8 7
tive search theories in support of its decisions.8 6 In Latta o. Fitzharris,

the leading decision of the Ninth Circuit, the court, however, relied primarily on the administrative search theory.88 The Latta court analogized
parole searches to certain types of administrative searches to which the
warrant requirement does not apply. 89 Generally, a warrant is required
in an administrative search when the resident of the premises to be
searched withholds consent. The United States Supreme Court created
an exception to this rule in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States9 O and
86. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1975)

(contract-consent); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
897 (1975) (administrative search).

87. 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). The Latta court
chose to limit its discussion stating: "California raises the question whether it can constitutionally expressly condition parole upon a waiver of the parolee's Fourth Amendment

rights. It does not argue that any waiver took place. We therefore do not consider the
question that California seeks to present." Id. at 249 n.1.
88. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). In Latta, the defendant
was arrested at the home of an acquaintance. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was
holding a pipe that contained marijuana. Six hours after the arrest, the parole officer
searched Latta's home without a warrant and without consent. Four-and-one-half pounds
of marijuana was discovered. Id. at 247. The court upheld the constitutionality of the
search and the admission of the seized evidence in a parole revocation hearing. Id. at 25253. In support of its conclusion that the warrant requirement did not apply to parole
searches, the plurality opinion noted the special relationship that exists between parolees
and their supervisory officers, the parolee's diminished expectation of privacy, and society's overriding interest in protecting itself. See id. at 251-52. In addition, the plurality
opinion said parole searches need not be supported by probable cause but "may even be
based on a 'hunch,' arising from what . . . [the parole officer] has learned or observed
about the behavior and attitude of the parolee." Id. at 250.
Although Latta involved a parolee rather than a probationer, the differences between
the two are not significant for purposes of granting constitutional protection. See Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-91 (1973). For opposing viewpoints on the question of
whether parolees and probationers should be given similar protection, compare Comment,
The Rights of the Probationer. A Legal Limbo, 28 U. Prrr. L. REV. 643, 650-51 (1967) with 18
VAND. L. REV. 754, 761 (1965). The Earnest court, relying upon Latta, perceived "no
material distinction" between the two. See 293 N.W.2d at 368 n.2. In prior decisions,
however, the Minnesota court had distinguished probation from parole for purposes of
good time credit while under supervision. See, e.g., Vezina v. State, 289 N.W.2d 408, 41112 (Minn. 1979) (credit not afforded for good time served while on probation even though
defendant served one year in workhouse; good time credit would be allowed for time on
parole); State ex rel. Ahern v. Young, 273 Minn. 240, 246-47, 141 N.W.2d 15, 19-20 (1966)
(same). The Ahem court justified the result on the grounds that "[o]ne who has been
convicted of a crime, has received no punishment, and has proved nothing as to his ability
to submit to rigid discipline is simply not entitled to the same concessions as one who has
been punished and demonstrated an ability to reform." Id. at 247, 141 N.W.2d at 19-20.
In this Comment, the two categories of offenders will be considered as one in the treatment of this subject. But cf. note 146 infra and accompanying text (arguing that court
issuing warrant may consider criminal record which is likely to distinguish two categories
of offenders).
89. See id. at 251.
90. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In Colonnade, federal agents visited petitioner's establishment,
a catering operation, to confirm a possible violation of federal excise tax law. Id. at 73.
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United States v. Biswell.9 1 The Court held that when "regulatory inspections further urgent federal interests, and the possibilities of abuse and
the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection
may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute." 9 2 The Court implied that well-tailored rules governing inspection
procedures must be promulgated. 93 In lieu of these rules, regulatory in9
spections are governed by the fourth amendment. 4
The Latta court viewed warrantless parole searches as consistent with
the Colonnade-Biswell exception.95 Specifically, it cited the pervasiveness
of regulation to which a parolee is subject, the long standing judicial
Under the authority of sections 5146(b) and 2606 of title 26 of the United States Code,
which broadly authorizes agents of the Treasury Department to inspect retail liquor establishments, the agents inspected petitioner's cellar and broke into a storeroom seizing bottles of liquor. Id. at 73 nn.l-2, 74. They did so without consent or a warrant. Id. at 73.
The Court held Congress had broad authority to permit warrantless entry onto liquor
establishments but that the statute enacted by Congress precluded forcible entry. See id.at
77.
91. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). In Biswell, a Federal Treasury agent visited respondent's
pawn shop and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom. Id. at 312. Asked if he had a
search warrant, the agent responded that the Gun Control Act authorized the inspection.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976). An inspection revealed two sawed-off shotguns that
respondent was not licensed to possess. 406 U.S. at 312. The Court found the search
constitutional despite the agent's failure to secure a warrant or consent. See id. at 317.
92. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317; see Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970). Both of these decisions indicate the warrant requirement may be obviated when a "pervasively regulated business" is the object of the search.
See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316-17; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. at 77. This view is in part premised on the theory that defendants who
engage in these businesses have a diminished expectation of privacy. See United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
The Colonnade-Biswellexception to the warrant requirement was limited considerably
by Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In Marshall, the Court held that warrantless inspections of business premises violate the fourth amendment unless the business
traditionally has been regulated pervasively by the government. See id. at 313. Future
warrantless administrative searches may depend on licensing, the extent of government
regulation, and other related criteria. See Note, Because Fourth Amendment Guarantees Are
Violated Through ProceduresEmployed by OSHA Adm'nitrate SearchesIssuance of a WarrantMust
Occur Priorto Any Such Inspections, Unless the Search Is Subject to the "Perastvel Regulated Bsiness" Exception, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 84 (1979). It is apparent that the Court in Marshall
was deliberately limiting the Colonnade-Biswell exception. See 436 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Regardless of whether the reliance of the Ninth Circuit on the Colonnade-Biswell exception is misplaced, the limitation placed on it by Marshall has made its use in the
criminal context inappropriate. It is doubtful that warrantless searches by probation officers will fit within that narrow interpretation. See notes 104-08 in/ra and accompanying
text.
93. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
94. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
95. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.) ("Our refusal to impose the warrant requirement . . . is consistent with the Supreme Court's refusal to require a warrant
in certain types of administrative searches."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 897 (1975).
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authority in California supporting warrantless searches, and the necessity
9
for unannounced and frequent searches of probationers and parolees. 6
This relationship was deemed unique and thus required special consideration. 97 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not extend this special treatment to allow federal law enforcement officers to search a probationer's
residence without a warrant. 98 A warrantless search of a probationer is
constitutional only when conducted under the supervision of a probation
officer.9 9 To allow unlimited searches of parolees would, in the words of
the Latta court, "practically gut the principle that parolees are entitled to
some privacy" and would "undermine the rehabilitative process." 100
This does not preclude police from participating in such searches if requested by the probation or parole officer as long as the search does not
become a "mere subterfuge" for criminal investigations. O1 Furthermore,

the Ninth Circuit found the exclusionary rule inapplicable to probation
or parole revocation proceedings. Evidence seized in even an unconstitutional search would be admissible in these proceedings.102
The Fourth Circuit extends greater protection to probationers and parolees by requiring that a warrant be obtained prior to a search.10 3 In
°
the court held that "unless an established exUnited States v. Bradl, 104
ception to the warrant requirement is applicable, a parole officer must
secure a warrant prior to conducting a search of a parolee's place of residence." 10 5 The Bradl court rejected the Ninth Circuit's application of
96. See i'd.
97. See id. at 249-50.
98. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975).
99. Id. at 266.
100. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897
(1975).
101. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 267 (quoting Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 249).
102. See United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1975) (exclusionary rule not extended to probation revocation when searching officers are unaware of
probationer's status); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975) (exclusion
of evidence in probation proceedings would have minimal deterrent effect on police and
would frustrate remedial purpose of probation); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521
F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975) (court distinguished between use of illegally obtained evidence to use in revocation hearing and to obtain new conviction for offense for which not
on probation). See generally notes 152-93 bnfra and accompanying text.
103. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978); Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436,
439 (4th Cir. 1950).
104. 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978). In Bradley, a parolee was subject to conditions contained in the parole agreement that he not possess a firearm and that he permit visits by
his parole officer at his home or place of employment. 571 F.2d at 788. After receiving
reports that defendant possessed a loaded firearm, defendant's parole officer searched
Bradley's room without consent and without a warrant. See id. The court held that the
search was constitutionally defective for failure to secure a warrant. See id. at 790.
105. 571 F.2d at 789. In so holding, the Bradley court specifically rejected both the
custody and contract-consent theories. See id.
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the Colonnade-Bzswell exception. In the Bradley court's view, two prerequisites for application of the exception were express statutory authorization
for such searches and the existence of guidelines to structure the discretion of the individual conducting the search.10 6 Because both of these
elements were absent, the Bradley court refused to apply the exception. 107
Therefore the general rule applicable to administrative searches is that a
warrant must be obtained prior to a search. 1o The court noted that
important governmental interests were indeed at stake but concluded
that the warrant requirement would not prove disruptive in achieving
those objectives.10 9 The governmental interest in close supervision of parolees, however, would serve to lower the standard of proof that an officer
must meet in obtaining a warrant. Although the court declined to specify precisely what this standard should be, it did reject the Latta standard
of a mere "hunch" and suggested that "some articulable grounds must
still be advanced. '""I0
The Bradley court was not presented with the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied to parole revocation proceedings. In UnitedSlates
v. Workman,"'I the Fourth Circuit balanced the rule's deterrent effect on
official misconduct against the disruption that application of the rule
would impose on the proceedings.'12 Noting that probation revocations
often are a substitute for criminal proceedings, the court held that the
exclusionary rule was applicable to probation revocation proceedings,
serving to bar the use of any evidence seized in contravention of the
3
fourth amendment." 1
106. See id. at 789.
107. See id. at 789-90. In Latta, the court sidestepped this issue by concluding "[t]here
is no express statute here, but there is long standing judicial authority in California [for
warrantless searches], and we can perceive no constitutional reason for failing to give
weight to that authority." Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 897 (1975).
108. See United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d at 789-90.
109. See id. at 790.
110. See id. at 790 n.4 (citing United States v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1159

(W.D.N.Y. 1975)).
111. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978). In Workman, a probationer was subject to a probation agreement that specified that he not possess, manufacture, sell, or buy any illegal

whiskey and that he not violate any state or federal law. See id. at 1206. Subsequently, a
federal agent and defendant's probation officer searched a building on Workman's property without warrant or consent. See id. at 1207. The search disclosed an illegal distillery.
See id. The court found the search illegal for failure to secure a warrant and excluded the
evidence in a probation revocation proceeding. See id. at 1208-10.

112. See id. at 1209-10.
113. See id.; notes 181-86 inra and accompanying text.
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THE MINNESOTA APPROACH

The Warrant Clause and ProbationSearches

In State v.Earnest,114 the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the majority view in holding that a probationer's rights were not violated by a
warrantless search based upon probable cause.1 5 In support of its decision, the Earnest court cited the four rationales underlying the special
treatment of probationers and parolees: grace, contract-consent, constructive custody, and administrative search.11 6 After a brief description
of each theory, the court stated:
We note that the "administrative search" theory appears to be more
rational than the [other three] ...and most likely to produce results
consistent with underlying fourth amendment principles. However,
the particular theory chosen upon which the decision is based is of no
consequence if the decision is the correct one.' 17
As illustrated in the preceding section, 18 the initial inquiry under the
administrative search theory is "whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search."" 19 The resolution of this issue, in turn, requires an assessment of
the needs of the governmental agency involved and of the extent and
nature of the privacy intrusions.120 The Earnest court, while not directly
addressing this issue, emphasized as justification for a warrantless search
the pervasive scrutiny to which probationers are subject, the lowered expectation of privacy entertained by probationers, the "demands of the
probation relationship," and the deterrent effect that extension of the
warrant requirement may have on judges in choosing probation among
sentencing alternatives.121
Although these considerations demonstrate the need and justification
for close supervision, none except for the last factor bears directly on the
deleterious effect that procurement of a warrant would have upon effective probation and parole supervision. The court observed that "putting
onerous restrictions on the ability of a probation officer to protect the
public interest may actually deter courts from a judicious use of probation in the future in marginal cases."122 The validity of such a conse114. 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980).
115. See id. at 369. For a discussion of the majority view, see notes 86-102 supra and
accompanying text.
116. See 293 N.W.2d at 368 n.3; notes 20-64 supra and accompanying text.
117. 293 N.W.2d at 368 n.3.
118. See notes 55-64 supra and accompanying text.
119. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
120. See White, supra note 18, at 183.
121. 293 N.W.2d at 369 (citing Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 247-50 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975)).
122. Id. The court articulated the same rationale in two recent decisions that denied
credit for time served on probation. See Vezina v. State, 289 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn.
1979); State ex ret. Ahern v. Young, 273 Minn. 240, 247, 141 N.W.2d 15, 20 (1966). In
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quence, however, is questionable. If the warrant requirement is confined
to only the most severe and intrusive supervisory forms such as unscheduled nighttime home visits, full body searches, and searches of
home and belongings, probation officers will not be unduly hampered in
the performance of their duties. 12 3 Presumably, these more intrusive supervisory activities are not within the daily routine of probation officers
and are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. Thus, it is doubtful
that the warrant requirement would deter probation officers from utilizing these supervisory techniques in those relatively rare cases in which it
would be appropriate for them to do so.
The Earnest court apparently assumed that the warrant procedure
would result in less supervision and, consequently, in higher recidivism.1 24 The warrant requirement, however, would not necessarily lead

to less effective supervision. Rather it would merely ensure that when
severe intrusions into an offender's privacy are contemplated, such intrusions are first examined by a disinterested magistrate and, further, that
the forms of supervision are carefully tailored to serve both the public's
and the individual offender's interests. 125 Therefore, it is unlikely that
courts will be reluctant to impose probation rather than incarceration
just because a warrant may be required as part of supervision. Moreover, judges are at least presumptively constrained under Minnesota's
new sentencing legislation to the disposition recommended by the sentencing guidelines.126 Departure from the recommended disposition
may occur only when a judge is convinced that substantial and compelling circumstances dictate doing so and the reasons are specified in writing. 127 It is unlikely that subjecting a probation officer to the warrant
requirement would place a case in that category. Thus, a refusal to sentence an individual to probation because of a general view that probation officers labor under "onerous" restrictions in supervising
Ahem, the court noted "if credit were required to be given, it is foreseeable that a sentenc-

ing court would be less inclined to impose the risks of probation on society, knowing that
such concessions might hinder communicating to the defendant the full impact of responsibility for his acts and, possibly, frustrate rehabilitation." Id. at 247, 141 N.W.2d at 20,
quoted in Vezina v. State, 289 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. 1979).
123. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.

124. See 293 N.W.2d at 368 (probation officer must work towards rehabilitation using
up-to-date knowledge of probationer's habits and activities).
125. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
126. See MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (1980). Seegeneral, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

(1980) [hereinafter cited as

REPORT

TO THE LEGISLATURE].

127. See REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 126, at 30. The Report provides
that judges "shall utilize the presumptive sentence provided in the Sentencing Guidelines
Grid unless the individual case involves substantial and compelling circumstances." Id.
Following this statement, the Report lists factors that if present in a case could justify a
departure from the guidelines. Id. at 31-32. None of the listed factors is even remotely
similar to the court's concern over "onerous" restrictions placed upon probation officers.
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probationers would likely be subject to reversal on appeal.12 8
An additional issue related to the applicability of the warrant requirement is the risk and seriousness of groundless intrusions. 129 If this risk is
sufficiently high, the warrant procedure should apply to that category of
searches to deter the conduct to which the fourth amendment is directed.' 30 Although the Earnest court declined to address this issue, the
risk of groundless invasions of a probationer's privacy may be significant
because under existing law a mere "hunch" of a probation violation may
be sufficient to justify a search.' 3 1 Police may be tempted to abuse the
probation relationship to conduct "fishing expeditions" or to harass offenders. 132 Currently, evidence seized in such searches is admissible in
either a probation revocation proceeding or in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.133 Justice Rogosheske, in his concurring opinion, expressed
128. See MINN. STAT. § 244.11 (1980). Section 244.11 grants to the supreme court the
power "to determine whether the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements,
unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the
findings of fact issued by the district court." Id. This statute gives the supreme court the
ability to counteract any deleterious effect a warrant requirement may have on district
courts in choosing probation among sentencing alternatives.
129. Seegenerally White, supra note 18. In his article, Professor White analyzes the necessity for a warrant in light of the nature of the privacy intrusion. See id. at 185-99.
130. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
131. See 293 N.W.2d at 369 n.5. The court stated:
We need not decide whether a lesser standard of probable cause applies to
searches of this type. See note I supra; cf. Latta v. Fizharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975) (suggesting
that a mere "hunch" may be sufficient). Nor need we decide the legality of a
warrantless probation search in which police officers participate.
Id. By citing Latta with approval for the proposition that a mere "hunch" is sufficient, the
court may be indicating that it approves such a standard. But see id. at 372 (Rogosheske,
J., concurring specially); note 137 mfia.
132. See People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1063, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800-01
(1973) ("Unrestricted search of a probationer by any and all law enforcement officers at
their whim and caprice is a form of harassment that amounts to an unreasonable
search."), overruled on other grounds, People v. McGaughran, 585 P.2d 206, 214 & n.19, 149
Cal. Rptr. 584, 592 & n.19 (1978). But see People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 764-65, 488
P.2d 630, 633-34, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (1971) (warrantless search without probable cause
by police officer of probationer held reasonable under fourth amendment), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1016 (1972).
In a well reasoned dissent, Justice Peters expressed concern that police officers might
harass probationers if not subject to the warrant requirement and probable cause
standard:
[Ilt is a proper purpose of a probation officer to ascertain whether the probationer is obeying all laws and the terms of his probation. But this function is
undertaken with the goal of rehabilitating the offender. Law enforcement officers generally, on the other hand, do not have such goals in mind. It must be
neither their role nor their prerogative to treat probationers as a specially suspect
class of citizens. I can see no justification for extending the waiver of all Fourth
Amendment rights to all law enforcement officers.
Id. at 769, 488 P.2d at 636, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (Peters, J., dissenting).
133. See 293 N.W.2d at 369 & n.6; notes 171-76 infta and accompanying text. Because
the search was found to be lawful the Earnest court did not reach the question of whether

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss2/6

26

et al.: Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers and Parolees [State v. Ea

1981]

FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

concern that the majority would thwart the rehabilitation goals of the
probation system: "[t]he majority has enabled probation officers to assume a prosecutorial role unintended by the probation system, since once
evidence is lawfully seized it cannot be excluded in a subsequent criminal
prosecution." 134
On balance, the warrant requirement should be extended only to the
more intrusive supervisory activities. Affording this protection to probationers and parolees is appropriate because of the potential of unnecessary intrusions and because of the absence of any showing that the
warrant procedure would negate the effectiveness of probation or parole
supervision. A warrant may be needed especially when evidence seized
by a probation or parole officer could be used to convict the probationer
or parolee of a separate criminal offense.
B.

Reasonableness of Probation Searches

In upholding the warrantless search in Earnest, the Minnesota
Supreme Court confined its decision to probation searches based upon
probable cause. 135 The court declined to determine what standard of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment governed probation
searches. 136 Although it is possible that the court viewed such searches as
constitutional only when based upon probable cause, it is more likely
that the court endorses some lesser standard of probable cause because it
relied heavily on Latta v. Fitzharrits.13 7 The plurality in Latta found that a
mere "hunch" of a parole violation can justify a search by a parole officer
and that "the parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole
officer when the officer reasonably believes that search is necessary in the
performance of his duties."' 38 Presumably, this view is premised on the
balancing approach of the administrative search theory under which the
governmental interests underlying the search are weighed against the inthe exclusionary rule should be applied in probation revocation hearings to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 369.
134. 293 N.W.2d at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
135. See 293 N.W.2d at 369 n.5; note 131 supra.
136. See 293 N.W.2d at 369 n.5; note 131 supra.
137. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
In Earnest, Justice Rogosheshke, joined by Justices Otis, Wahl, and Yetka, voiced
concern that the majority opinion might be construed as permitting a warrantless search
of a probationer on the basis of the Latta standard of a mere "hunch." Justice Rogosheske
stated:
I am also concerned that the majority's reliance on Latta v. Ftlzharris, 521
F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975),
may be read too broadly .... Since probable cause for the search was admitted
in the present case, I would hope that our disposition is not interpreted as authorizing a warrantless search of a probationer's dwelling when the facts are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
293 N.W.2d at 372 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
138. 521 F.2d at 250.
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vasion that the search entails. 139
The balancing test is not a procedure to be used by judges to determine the standard of reasonableness in each individual case "but rather
as a technique for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct kinds of official actions."140 As discussed earlier, the theory
is designed to ensure that surveillance of probationers or parolees is only
as intrusive as is necessary to satisfy the public interest underlying the
probation or parole system. 41 Thus, the most severe category of intrusions-an unscheduled nighttime home visit, a full body search, or a
search of an offender's home-should be supported by a greater standard
of justification than that required for the less severe category of intrusions-a daytime home visit, a frisk for weapons, or an inspection of a
chemically dependent offender's arm.1 42 A mere "hunch" of a probation
violation should be sufficient to justify the less severe invasions on privacy. Not only are these supervisory activities less offensive but, further,
they are necessary to ensure that the supervisory officer has a working
knowledge of the offender's daily routines, relationships, and activities.143
139. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text. Other courts have applied the administrative search theory to parole or probation searches and have required reasonable
rather than probable cause. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp.
1155, 1158-60 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (Colo. 1975); State
v. Williams, 486 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Mo. 1972); People v. Santos, 82 Misc. 2d 184, 191-92,
368 N.Y.S.2d 130, 136 (1975); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 84, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094
(1973).
140. LaFave, "'StreetEncounters" and the Constitution.- Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 40, 57 (1968).
141. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text. Professor White cites three factors
to be considered in the application of the balancing test: (1)the extent of the intrusion;
(2) "the degree to which the invasion is a necessary part of a governmental program;" and
(3) prior acceptance by the courts and public of the program in question. White, supra
note 18, at 186 & n.91. The first two factors predominate in determining what degree of
evidence is sufficient to render a search reasonable. See id.
142. Se notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text. Professor White argues that the
quantum of evidence that is necessary for the search of an ordinary citizen, probable
cause, should be required for the more severe intrusions in the privacy of probationers and
parolees. See White, supra note 18, at 188, 193-97. The criminal history of the offender,
however, would provide one factor in the assessment of probable cause. See note 146 in/fa
and accompanying text.
For the less severe category of intrusions, Professor White would not require as stringent a showing. He would permit unscheduled daytime visits by a parole officer "so long
as the visits are made in good faith for the purpose of supervising the parolee and not for
the purpose of harassment." White, supra note 18, at 188. Thus, he would authorize surprise daytime visits to the extent necessary to effect a proper rehabilitation. See note 143
in/ia. As to frisks and examinations, Professor White argues that the authority that releases an offender---either the parole board or sentencing judge---should be permitted to
issue "personal examination" warrants effective during the supervisory period when it is
shown that such examinations are necessary to rehabilitate the offender. See White, supra
note 18, at 192-93; note 83 supra.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978) (dictum)
(visits to home or place of employment permissible "to aid probationers and to bring
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Intrusions such as those involved in Earnest, however, are not necessary in
every case to ensure the proper supervision of an offender. 144 Furthermore, the effect of a groundless intrusion on privacy interests is greater
because of the offensive character of the invasion. Thus, with respect to
this category of intrusions, either probable or reasonable cause should be
required. Justice Rogosheske would "require that the probation officer
be able to articulate concrete facts giving reasonable cause to believe that
evidence would be found in the place to be searched and that the search
not be needlessly intrusive in time or manner."14 5 In determining
whether a search is appropriate, the criminal history of an offender
would provide only one factor to be considered in the assessment of reasonable cause:
Just as a past arrest record is one factor which courts consider in determining whether probable cause existed for an arrest or search, so a
parolee's criminal history can supply one factor to be taken into account in deciding whether normal probable cause standards have been
met in a particular parole-officer search. 1 46
about improvements in their conduct and condition") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3655 (1976));
Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1976) (visits to probationer's home permissible
to "observe his lifestyle"). See generally White, supra note 18, at 186-93.
144. See Note, supra note 40, at 134-36. This commentator observes:
Assuming that rehabilitative progress frequently depends on parolee-parole-officer relationships founded on mutual trust and respect, developing confidence
and trust necessary for an effective relationship between parolee and parole officer is often difficult because parolees leave prison distrusting and resenting authority. So long as parole is characterized by authority arbitrarily exercised, the
prison-born resentment of authority is not likely to be dispelled and adjustment
to society is not likely to be hastened. Responsibility and respect for the rights of
others presuppose certain reasonable expectations that one's own privacy will be
respected. When a parole officer indiscriminately searches his parolee's person,
home, or effects, rehabilitation is thwarted because earlier patterns of resentment
and distrust of law-enforcement officials are reinforced.
Id. at 134-35 (citations omitted).
145. 293 N.W.2d at 372 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
146. Note, supra note 40, at 136. By considering the criminal history of an offender, it
is likely that reasonable cause to search will be found in a greater proportion in parolee
cases than in probationer cases. This is true because the criminal history of an offender
serves as one of two primary factors under the sentencing guidelines that determines the
disposition of an offender. See REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 126, at 27-29, 38.
If an offender has several prior felony convictions, he is far more likely to fall below the
dispositional line on the sentencing grid and would thus be incarcerated rather than
placed on probation.
Consideration of criminal history in the assessment of reasonable cause to search is
appropriate in light of the demonstrable fact of a higher recividism rate among parolees.
A Minnesota study of individuals paroled in 1977 found that 15% of those paroled were
later subject to new court commitments and 23% had their parole status revoked. See
Minnesota Department of Corrections, Persons Released on Parole 1977: Returns to A
State Institution With Revocation or New Court Commitment as of January 1, 1980, at 6
(1980) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). A comparable study of individuals paroled from Minnesota facilities in 1978 found that 11% received new court commitments and 23% had their parole status revoked. See Minnesota Department of
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One of the paramount goals of the probation and parole system is rehabilitation. 14 7 To achieve this goal, a relationship of trust must exist
between an offender and his supervisory officer. 148 Indiscriminate, intrusive searches by a supervisory officer on the pretext of a mere "hunch" of
a probation or parole violation ill serves the rehabilitative ideal.'4 9 This
is particularly true when the purpose of the search is to gather evidence,
thrusting the supervisory officer into a prosecutorial role.150 In this environment, an offender may be encouraged to entertain an attitude of cynicism, "game playing," or manipulation of the system to the detriment of
the rehabilitative goal.151

C

Use of the Evidence

The exclusionary rule,152 which was first announced by the Supreme
Court in Weeks v. United States 153 and made binding on the states in Mapp
Corrections, Persons Released on Parole 1978: Returns to A State Institution With Revocation or New Court Commitment as of January 1, 1980, at 4 (1980) (on file at William
Mitchell Law Review office). In contrast, a dispositional sentencing study by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission found that among a population of offenders who
received felony probationary sentences between July 1, 1977 through June 30, 1978, only
6% were revoked and returned to correctional facilities. See Letter from Kay A. Knapp,
Research Director of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, to Michael
Madigan (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
147. See MINN. STAT. § 609.01(1) (1980) (defining "the rehabilitation of those convicted" as one purpose of Criminal Code); Note, supra note 40, at 134. The statutory
authority for parole and probation is found in MINN. STAT. §§ 609.12, .135 (1980).
148. See Note, supra note 40, at 134.
149. See id.
150. See 293 N.W.2d at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
151. See Note, supra note 40, at 134-35. The author notes that not only will arbitrary
searches increase the parolee's resentment of authority but subjecting a parolee to frequent
searches will affect the way the parolee is viewed and treated by his family and the community. Id. at 135. In addition, parolees will not develop internal behavior controls but
will continue to rely on the types of external regulation that was imposed upon them
during their incarceration. Id.
152. Ordinarily, the remedy afforded an individual whose fourth amendment rights
have been violated is the suppression of the seized evidence for prosecution purposes. The
remedy is known as the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying fourth amendment to exclude evidence in state court); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (error to use illegally seized evidence in federal criminal adjudicative proceedings); State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 867 (1963)
(citing Mapp rule). A prerequisite to application of the rule is a finding that the evidence
sought to be admitted was seized in an illegal search. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Because the Earnest majority concluded the search was reasonable under the
fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule was not relevant to the decision. See 293 N.W.2d
at 369. For a general discussion of the applicability of the rule to probation revocation
proceedings, see Cole, The Exc/usionary Rule in Probationand ParoleRevocation Proceedings. Some
Observations on Deterrence and the "Imperative ofJudcialIntegrity," 52 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 21
(1975); notes 170-93 infra and accompanying text.
153. See 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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v. Ohio,' 54 is a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 15S It has been said
that without the rule the fourth amendment would be reduced to a
"form of words."' 56 Two policies underlie the exclusionary rule: the deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct and the preservation ofjudicial integrity.157 The major function of the rule, embodied by the first
policy, is to eliminate the incentive on the part of law enforcement officials to act in contravention of the fourth amendment.158 An ancillary
concern is to preserve judicial integrity by providing that "[c]ourts which
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.' '159
The exclusionary rule from its inception has been the focus of protracted debate.160 Many commentators have pointed to the dramatic
impact that application of the rule has on law enforcement, the lack of
empirical evidence demonstrating the deterrent effect of the rule, and
generally, the observation that the rule seems to benefit only the
guilty.161

Criticism of the rule has led to the conclusion that the rule

should be confined to proceedings in which it can be clearly demonstrated that the benefits to be derived from the application of the rule
outweigh the impediments imposed on those proceedings.' 62 This bal154. See 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
155. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (footnote omitted). In addition, the Calandra Court stated: "As with any remedial device, the application of the rule
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. By characterizing the rule as a creature of judicial fiat rather than as
a constitutional mandate, the Court permitted the selective application of the rule according to the type of proceeding within which it is invoked. See notes 162-69 infa and accompanying text.
156. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
157. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
158. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
159. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
160. For a collection of authorities discussing the exclusionary rule, see Comment,
Trends in Legal Commenta von the Exclusionary Rule, 65 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 373
(1974).
161. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 152; Spiotto, Search and Seiure: An EmpiricalStudy of the
Exclusonagy Rule andItr Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Wright, Must the Criminal
Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736 (1972).
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is its deterrent impact on governmental lawbreaking. At least one study, however, indicates the rule does not deter official
misconduct. See J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 220 (2d ed. 1975). The author
of that study concludes that a policeman views his primary function as ferreting out crime.
Although an officer may try to later justify a search after the fact, he will not pass up the
opportunity to seize dangerous articles even though no conviction is possible. See id.
162. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (Court refused to ex-
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ancing test was first announced in United States v. Calandra.16 3 Pursuant
to this view, the Supreme Court has held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to cases before a grand jury in which incriminating questions are
based on evidence unlawfully seized, 164 to cases in which the defendant
165
to
lacks standing because he was not the victim of the unlawful search,
cases involving the admissibility of illegal evidence for a purpose other
than to prove guilt,16 6 and to cases in which the prosecution sought to
introduce incriminating statements made prior to the Miranda decision. 167 These cases illustrate two basic precepts relied on by the Court
in its application of the balancing test. First, the rule will not be applied
when it appears that its deterrent effect upon illegal police conduct
would at best be minimal.168 Second, "the need for deterrence and
hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest where the
Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal
69
sanction on the victim of a search."
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of the applicability of the rule to probation or parole revocation proceedings, a
majority of jurisdictions that have decided the question have found the
rule inapplicable.1 70 The Earnest court never reached the issue of the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedtend exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings). See generaly Cole, supra note 152, at 2633.
163. See 414 U.S. at 350; Cole, supra note 152, at 28-29.
164. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974).
165. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973); Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 171-76 (1969).
166. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement that violated Mi
randa was admissible to impeach defendant); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
(testimony regarding illegal search could be used to impeach defendant); United States v.
Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970) (illegally seized evidence could be used to determine
sentence), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
167. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (pre-Miranda interrogation not excluded where police conduct not in bad faith or wilfull).
168. See id.at 446-47; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
169. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
denied, 423 U.S. 787 (1975); United States v. Brown,
Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.), cert.
448 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel.
States ex rel.
Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1970), a.fd, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976); Croteau
App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682,
v. State, 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill.
afd,62 I1. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1974); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975); State
v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980); State v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692
(1974); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973). Contra, United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. App.
1973). See generall.y Cole, supra note 152.
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ings because it found the search constitutionally permissible.1 71 In dictum, the court did state, however, that "[o]n the facts presented in this
' 72
case . . . [the evidence] should be admissible in a new prosecution." 1
Indeed, no legal basis exists for excluding such evidence because a fundamental prerequisite to the application of the exclusionary rule is that the
evidence that is sought to be barred must have been seized in an illegal
search.173 If evidence resulting from a probation search is admissible in a
criminal prosecution, the Earnest holding may tempt police to solicit the
aid of supervisory officers who do not labor under the "onerous" restrictions of the warrant requirement to gather evidence or harass offenders
in a manner not otherwise allowed under the fourth amendment.174
Similarly, probation officers might be tempted to "assume a
prosecutorial role unintended by the probation system."'75
The concurring opinion in Earnest adhered to the majority view that
the rule should not apply to probation revocation proceedings:
A probation officer has unannounced access to his client's environment
to enable him to assess and guide his probationer's progress. His purpose is primarily to counsel his client and secondarily to enforce the
terms of probation in the public interest. In my view, application of
the exclusionary rule would hamper the effective functioning of the
76
probation system rather than deter unlawful conduct. 1
While the concurring opinion failed to further delineate the basis for
its conclusions, several justifications might be offered. In United States v.
WMnsett,1 77 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals identified four major pol171. See 293 N.W.2d at 369.
172. Id. at 369 n.6.
173. See id. This is not to suggest that in the initial determination of the constitutionality of a search the court should consider the possible introduction of the seized evidence in
a subsequent proceeding. As Justice Rogosheske points out "[tjhe possible use of evidence
is not an aspect of the reasonableness of a search." Id. at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring
specially).
174. The Earnest majority apparently was uncomfortable with the conclusion that evidence seized in warrantless searches of probationers was admissible in subsequent criminal
prosecutions. The majority went to great lengths to delineate situations in which such
evidence might not be admissible. See id. at 369 n.6. Presumably, the majority was concerned that the admissibility of evidence in subsequent trials would tempt police officers to
obviate the warrant requirement by accompanying probation officers on searches. Indeed, the majority warned that "the best course of action for probation officers and police
is to obtain a warrant whenever it is possible to do so." .d.
175. Id. at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
176. Id. at 371-72 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially). Justice Rogosheske necessarily confronted the question of the exclusionary rule's applicability to probation revocation
proceedings because he found the search constitutionally defective for failure to secure a
warrant. See id. at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially).
177. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975). In Wrnsett, defendant was placed on probation for
four years for conspiring to import marijuana. Id. at 52. Four months later, defendant
was stopped at a checkpoint by federal border control agents who discovered and seized
100 pounds of marijuana. On the basis of this evidence, revocation proceedings were commenced in federal district court. See ad. The court found the evidence was seized illegally
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icy factors to be weighed in the determination of whether the rule should
be applied to probation revocation proceedings: (1) the deterrent effect
of the rule on governmental lawbreaking; (2) the effect of the rule on the
rehabilitative ideal by depriving the corrections system of important information regarding a probationer's rehabilitation potential; (3) the effect of the rule on the public safety by denying the means to incarcerate
a potentially dangerous offender; and (4) the effect that forcing probation officers to devote more time gathering admissible evidence for the
purpose of revocation would have on the resources of the corrections system. 178 Balancing these factors, the Winsett court held that the rule
should not apply to probation revocation proceedings because the deterrent effect of the rule would be minimal at best and because extension of
the rule would pose significant dangers to the probation system. 179 Thus,
but denied defendant's motion to suppress because it held the exclusionary rule to be
inapplicable to federal probation revocation proceedings. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. at 52-55.
178. See id. at 54-55.
179. See id. at 55. Two additional rationales not mentioned by the court might be
offered to support its holding. First, the special training and rehabilitative focus on probation officers minimizes the risk of unlawful intrusions and thereby renders unnecessary the
need for the rule's deterrent effect. Second, in light of the demonstrable fact of high recidivism, the need to protect society assumes predominate importance when evidence, however obtained, reveals a violation of a probation condition. See note 146 supra.
The first rationale appears to contradict the conclusion of the Earnest concurring
opinion that extension of the warrant requirement to probation searches is necessary to
protect against unwarranted intrusions. See 293 N.W.2d at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially). An argument can be made, however, that the greatest danger to an offender's privacy is presented by police seeking to gather evidence for a subsequent
criminal prosecution rather than by probation officers in their rehabilitative role. See id.
Thus, by imposing the judgment of a neutral detached magistate over probation
searches, police would not be tempted to obviate the warrant requirement and pressure
supervising officers to assume a prosecutorial role. Justice Rogosheske impliedly relied
upon this rationale when he stated: "This approach would permit fulfillment of the objecties of the probation system without tempting the police to use probation officers to acquire evidence that the police could not lawfully obtain without a warrant." 293 N.W.2d
at 372 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially). This argument overlooks the reality that
revocation proceedings often serve as a substitute for criminal prosecutions. See United
States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978). According to one commentator,
to permit the admission of illegally seized evidence in revocation proceedings would in fact
"provide an incentive to police officers to abuse parole officer search powers to serve their
own law enforcement ends." Note, supra note 41, at 825.
The second rationale is subject to the criticism that repeat offenders often are before
the courts in new criminal prosecutions in which they could nonetheless avail themselves
of the benefits of the rule. This criticism might be answered by noting basic differences
between revocation proceedings and criminal prosecutions. In the former, proceedings are
governed by statute and judicial scrutiny is narrowly focused upon an allegation of a
violation of a probation or parole condition. See MINN. STAT. § 609.14 (1980) (statute
requires court focus upon whether "the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his
probation or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which warrants the imposing or
execution of sentence"). As illustrated by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), such proceedings are not subject to the same evidentiary rules although
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the court applied the Calandra test and concluded that the benefits to be
derived from the application of the rule were outweighed by the impediments imposed on revocation proceedings and the probation system in
general. 180

In United States v. Workman, 18 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
employed a different analysis. Although the Workman court recognized
that the Calandra balancing test governed the applicability of the exclusionary rule, the court perceived no significant difference between probation revocations and other criminal adjudicative proceedings.18 2 The
court used the Calandra test by analogizing probation revocation proceedings to other proceedings in which the Supreme Court had considered
the applicability of the rule.183 The Workman court found that the
Supreme Court had never refused to apply the rule to "any adjudicative
proceeding in which the government offer[ed] unconstitutionally seized
evidence in direct support of a charge that [might] subject the victim of a
search to imprisonment."184 The Workman court further stressed that
probation revocation proceedings often serve as an attractive alternative
to criminal prosecutions.185 Thus, the court held that probation revocation proceedings were not exempt from the operation of the exclusionary
rule. 186
some due process does attach to revocation proceedings. In spite of these arguments, no
compelling reason exists to exclude operation of the rule from revocation proceedings. See
notes 181-93 thfra and accompanying text.
180. See 518 F.2d at 55.
181. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978); see note III supra.
182. 585 F.2d at 1209-10.
183. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978). The court
stated that
an inferior court should conduct the balancing test . . . by comparing revocation hearings with other instances where the Supreme Court has considered the
rule's application. Such a comparison permits objective appraisal of the rule's
deterent effect in revocation proceedings by considering the Supreme Court's
assessment of that effect in other contexts.
Id. By applying the Calandra balancing test in this manner, the court implied that other
courts had resolved the issue on the basis of their underlying view of the exclusionary rule.
In this regard, the court stated that the "potential advantages and disadvantages of applying the rule to probation revocation proceedings cannot be ascertained by generalized
reference to the pros and cons of the rule--a subject that has been the topic of lively
debate from the moment of the rule's promulgation." d.
184. Id. at 1211. In the following cases the Court allowed illegally obtained evidence
to be admitted because it would not directly support a charge or result in imprisonment.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (impeachment of defendant); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974) (grand jury proceeding); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (admitted
evidence of illegal search against party not searched); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (civil forfeiture proceeding); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954) (impeachment of defendant).
185. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d at 1211.
186. See id.
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In those cases that have used the Calandra balancing test to determine
if the exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation proceedings, the
sole justification offered for applying the exclusionary rule to such proceedings has been the deterrent effect on official misconduct.187 These
courts have ignored the potential impact overzealous supervision may
have on the central goal of the probation system-rehabilitation of offenders.Ia a If the probation system fails to afford some modicum of privacy to a probationer, the probationer's faith in his ability to behave as a
responsible member of society is undermined.189 Furthermore, the probation officer who intrudes unnecessarily into a probationer's privacy has
weakened the bond of trust that is essential to a successful rehabilitation.
Studies have indicated that an offender's successful completion of probation is directly affected by the size of a probation officer's caseload. 190
This strongly implies that a close working relationship between a probation officer and a probationer is central to any rehabilitation plan. Consequently, some commentators and probation officers have suggested
that probation officers should be responsible only for treatment supervision.1 9 1 Surveillance should be left to police.
Another consideration often neglected by courts is the use of revocation as a substitute for criminal prosecution. Revocation often serves as a
more attractive alternative to prosecution because revocation proceedings are less costly, less time consuming, and are subject to less stringent
rules of evidence that permit the introduction of any reliable information. 192 Thus, the impact of the Mapp rule that excludes illegally seized
187. See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975). See Note, The Exclusionay, Rule in Probation
and Parole Revocaton." A Poliy Appraisal, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (1976).

188. The Winsett court, however, focused on evidence that may indicate the probationer's chances for a successful rehabilitation. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51,
55 (9th Cir. 1975). The court stated: "Because violation of probation conditions may
indicate that the probationer is not ready or is incapable of rehabilitation by integration
into society, it is extremely important that allreiable evidence shedding light on the probationer's conduct be available during probation revocation proceedings." Id. (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
189. See Note, supra note 40, at 134-36.
190. See

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-

TION OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 29 (1967); Note, supra note 40, at

134-36.
191. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 190, at 69.

192. See Note, supra note 187, at 1123. The Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) held that the evidentiary rules of criminal adjudications do not inflexibly
apply to probation revocation proceedings. The Court stated:
We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second state of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process

should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and
other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.

Id. at 489.
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evidence in criminal prosecutions is significantly undermined by permitting illegally seized evidence to serve as the basis for probation
revocations.
A final consideration rarely discussed by courts is the possible use of
illegally seized evidence outside of revocation proceedings. A probation
officer still could use this information in an extra-judicial fashion to either reprimand and warn a probationer or to seek more stringent probation conditions. In this way, effective supervision of a probationer could
be accomplished without de facto judicial approval of official
misconduct.
When the fruit of the government's illegal intrusion could result in the
incarceration of an offender, the burden of satisfying the Calandra test
should rest with the government. As noted by the Supreme Court, "the
need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence
are strongest where the government's unlawful conduct would result in
imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search."' 93 Furthermore, a court that orders revocation on the basis of such evidence has
somehow "tainted" judicial integrity. On balance, it appears the benefits
to be derived from the application of the rule to revocation proceedings
outweigh the potential injury to the probation system. Thus, the exclusionary rule should be held applicable to parole and probation revocation proceedings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional rights of probationers and parolees in areas other than
search and seizure law are acknowledged and safeguarded by the United
States Supreme Court.194 The rights afforded probationers or parolees,
however, are not as extensive as those provided ordinary citizens. Society's interest in protecting its members compels this distinction. That
interest, however, does not sanction adoption of a laissez-faire attitude
among the judiciary in regard to the fourth amendment rights of probationers or parolees. The only governmental entity that effectively may
prevent groundless invasions of the privacy of released offenders is the
court-law enforcement officers are themselves the threat to fourth
amendment abridgement. In addition, the only way an individual may
secure protection in advance of the search is through a warrant procedure that invokes judicial scrutiny. Courts, therefore, should not be reluctant to actively safeguard limited fourth amendment protection for
probationers and parolees. 195
193. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (footnote omitted).
194. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
195. The words of Justice Jackson, written in 1947 shortly after he presided over the
Nuremburg trials, have as much relevance today as when written.
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Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to
have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities
but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and
dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons, and possessions are
subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.
right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the most
. . [Tihe
[
difficult to protect. Since the officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is
no enforcement outside of court.
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure
without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves
and will push to the limit. We must remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that
there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For
example, any effective interference with freedom of the press, or free speech, or
religion, usually requires a course of suppressions against which the citizen can
and often does go to the court and obtain an injunction. Other rights, such as
that to an impartial jury or the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power
of the courts themselves. Such a right as just compensation for the taking of
private property may be vindicated after the act in terms of money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by
surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervision and
limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers whose own interests and
records are often at stake in the search. There is no opportunity for injunction or
appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to
whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate
violence.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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